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INTRODUCTION 
We stand now where two roads diverge. 
But unlike the roads in Robert Frost's familiar poem, they are not equally fair. 
The road we have long been traveling is deceptively easy, a smooth superhighway 
on which we progress with great speed, but at its end lies disaster. The other fork 
of the road -- the one "less traveled by" -- offers our last, our only chance to reach a 
destination that assures the preservation of our earth. 
(Carson 1962, 277) 
Problem Statement 
Since 1962 the issues may have changed but the clarion call remains 
clear. Iowa's landfills are filling up. In 1991, Iowans disposed of 2.3 million tons 
of trash. This averages to four and a half pounds per day per person. By the 
year 2000, at current rates, that amount is anticipated to increase another 
twenty percent. Eighty-eight percent of this trash is placed in landfills (ten 
percent recycled, two percent incinerated) (Arrandale 1992, 38). The refuse 
problem affects everyone because we all produce garbage. Over time the trash 
accumulates and new landfills are needed. However, no one wants a landfill: 
"[The] battle cry of 'Not in my backyard (NIMBY),' also means not in my front 
yard, side yard, on my street or in the vicinity of my eyes, ear, nose or throat" 
(Cronin 1989,46). How can this be reconciled? 
With an estimated average of only twelve years remaining in Iowa's 
landfills (Iowa, GPA 1987), the Iowa legislature has passed several laws which 
aim to both reduce the landfills' depletion rate and protect the groundwater 
sources. The 1987 Groundwater Protection Act attacks the landfill problem from 
a refuse reduction perspective. The law suggests reductions and offers a 
hierarchy of reduction approaches. The hierarchy, in order of priority, is: 1) 
volume reduction at the source, 2) recycling and reuse, 3) combustion with 
energy recovery and refuse-derived fuel, 4) combustion for volume reduction, and 
5) disposal in landfill (Iowa, GPA 1987, Div. IV, Part 1). In 1989 the legislature' 
put some teeth in this law, creating the Waste Reduction-Recycling Act (WR-RA) 
mandating 25% statewide reduction in landfilled waste by 1994 and a 50% 
decrease by 2000 using 1988 as the baseline year (Iowa WR-RA 1989, Iowa code, 
Chapter 455D). 
Refuse reduction is a classic collective action problem due to the public 
nature of the garbage collection (Sandler 1992a, 1992b). Collective action 
problems relate to a group's ability to provide itself a collective (public) good 
(Olson 1971). Determination of what goods a group should provide itselfis a 
collective choice question. The distinction between collective action and 
collective choice problems is important: when a society decides what goods to 
provide itself, through legislation, referendum, or administration (bureaucracy), 
it is making a collective choice. When society provides that good to itself there is 
collective action. Since some goods, because of their public good characteristics, 
are more difficult for a group to provide to itself, there are collective action 
problems. 
Public goods have two defining characteristics which distinguish them 
from private goods: nonrivalry and nonexcludability. To be nonrival is to be a 
good for which the consumption by one person does not limit or diminish the 
ability of another person to use the same unit of that good. Goods are 
nonexcludable when they are made available to one person, they are available to 
all. The reduction of landfill waste and subsequent extension of landfill life is 
something which benefits everyone therefore is at least an impure public good. 
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An impure public good is partially nonrival and/or partially excludable (Sandler 
1992b). Once the life of the landfill is extended, all members of the community 
benefit, even if they did nothing to contribute to that extension (i.e., they did not 
reduce their waste), thus, it is partially nonrival. However, it may be possible to 
bar some people from using the landfill, making the good at least partially 
excludable. In this discussion, it is the nonrivalry of the benefit which is most 
relevant, thus, landfill life extension is considered a public good. 
A second facet of the refuse reduction problem relates to the historic 
pricing of the landfill and other common resources. These resources, for example 
air, water, and soil, consistently are underpriced. The cost of maintenance and 
pollution clean up is often not included. The degradation of the air, water, or soil 
is often termed a negative externality. Externalities occur when one person's 
(group's, firm's) behavior affects another person's welfare but is neither 
compensated nor charged (Sandler 1992b). When these. include costs that society 
will pay later, they are called social costs. Externalities are market failures in 
that the price set by the market is not the correct price for society. This means 
the pricing system fails to provide the correct signals to the decision maker in 
terms of society's interests. 
Alterations in the incentive or pricing system represents one way to 
approach the collective action problem from a public policy perspective. The idea 
is to change the costs and benefit payoffs which people face when making the 
decision of whether or· not to recycle. The same incentives may create a different 
impact depending on the rationality, or value structure, of the individual person. 
Some people hold a conservation attitude, valuing the interdependence of man 
and nature and the possible impact on the environment. Others approach 
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environmental problems in the same manner they approach any economic 
decision, "What is the best bargain?" In order to be effective the recycling policy 
must consider these rationalities and creating a bargain while encouraging the 
conservationist's predisposition toward environmentally sensitive behavior. 
Communities attempt to choose the policy strategy which best fits their 
needs. There are several policy strategies from which communities may choose. 
Some may use voluntary drop off centers or voluntary curbside collections, 
others may mandate curbside collection, and still others may change the pricing 
system using a volume based rate plus the voluntary curbside program. In 
different ways these policies change the face of the refuse problem as they would 
alter the costs and benefits of participation in the recycling effort. Some policies 
will have more success than others. 
Research Objectives 
The objective of this study is to evaluate which alternative may generate 
the optimal result. In order to analyze the value consequences of the various 
incentives, a model needs to be created of the individual decision process within 
each policy, considering the type of individual rationality. However, because the 
individual is functioning within a community, the decision-making process is 
dependent also on other members of the community and their contributions to 
the collective goods. Collective action problems, as interdependent decisions, can 
be structured on the basis of game theory (Mueller 1989, Sandler 1992a, 1992b, 
McLean 1987, Harsanyi 1977)~ A game theory framework can model seventy-
eight distinct structures (in a bimatrix, two strategy form), three of these are 
used regularly to model collective action: Prisoner's Dilemma, Chicken, and 
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Fully Privileged (Sandler 1992a, 1992b, Mueller 1989, Reisman 1990, McLean 
1987). 
Analytically, this study changes policies into games. Each policy then is 
analyzed as a single encounter game. Additionally, one game will be used to 
model interaction between the two rationalities, another is the basis of a 
repeated game, and an n-person game. Social action situations, without 
coordination, are assumed to be Prisoner's Dilemmas situation. If the policies 
alter this structure to reveal a different game structure, then the change will be 
attributed to the incentive impact on individual decisions. 
The relationships focused on in this study are the impact of incentives in 
recycling policy on the individual decision making process. The goal is to 
determine which policies affect collective action. In order to accomplish this, I 
first examine the recycling policy strategies. I then sift through the literature 
for other evaluation studies on recycling incentives, and again, for research on 
the use of incentives in environmental policy and collective action problems 
generally. In order to understand the dynamics of collective action in connection" 
with recycling policy, I use game theory as a framework for analyzing the 
individual decision-making process. Game solutions are often a function of the 
rationality of the "player." Rationality is the last concept explored before turning 
to the actual analysis of the games. 
Applying game theory, I generate some specific hypotheses about the 
likelihood of citizens to participate in the various recycling policy strategies. The 
hypotheses generated in this study include: 
1. Voluntary approaches will lead to less refuse reduction than will 
mandatory or price changing approaches. 
2. Voluntary curbside collection will lead to a greater reduction in 
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landfilled cubic yardage than voluntary drop off centers. 
3. Whereas the success of volume based rate systems would depend on the 
price chosen, this price should make the benefits of recycling greater than 
the cost of participation. 
4. Mandatory curbside collection and a correctly priced volume based 
pricing system should have the same landfilled waste reduction impact. 
These hypotheses are drawn from the various rationalities of citizens in a 
local community. While these hypotheses are reasonable from the logical 
standpoint, they also should be subject to empirical validation. In this study I 
make an exploratory attempt to test their plausibility with a single sample of 
refuse collection data obtained from a municipality in Iowa. A more 
comprehensive empirical study is suggested for the future. 
The practical import of this study is to find ways to structure the policy 
debate on the problem of refuse collection. Effective policies do not function as 
band-aids to problems, they attack the roots of problems. Landfill depletion is a 
special problem because it is addressed in every town in Iowa and through out 
the United States. In order to choose well, communities need to know the facets, 
advantages, and disadvantages of the various potentially effective policy options. 
Recycling Policies 
Government regularly mediates the environmental externalities of 
industries and firms; however, the overuse oflandfills results from citizen 
behavior. This behavior can be guided through many venues, including 
governmental action. Refuse collection traditionally has been within the local 
government's realm. As local policy reflects the community preferences which 
create it, it takes on a variety of forms. The policies vary according to the 
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strength or pointedness of the incentive and the type of rationality to which it 
appeals. Generally, the policies fit into a spectrum from no incentive (no 
recycling possibility) to strong, pointed incentives, such as fines and penalties 
(mandated separation). The policies to be discussed are: voluntary drop-off 
centers, voluntary curbside collection, mandatory curbside collection, and volume 
based pricing in conjunction with voluntary curbside collection. 
When shifting recyclables out of regular trash and into recyclable 
collection, there may be a "proper" and or "complete" way to do so. By "proper" I 
mean that the citizen follows the instructions of the collector. This could include 
washing items, removing labels, separating certain items from others (e.g., milk 
jugs from other plastic bottles) or combining them (e.g., clear and colored glass 
together). If one had followed the recycling instructions completely, it would 
mean that all possible recyclables would have been separated from the trash. 
Complete separation is not always easy because some recyclables may not be 
distinguishable from non-recyclables (e.g., metal ends of cardboard frozen juice 
concentrate containers). 
Voluntary drop off centers 
Voluntary drop off centers represent the minimal infrastructure which 
makes recycling possible for most citizens. At a specified place(s) people can 
take separated recyclables and leave them. These places may be separate 
buildings, parts of buildings, or unattended collection centers in department 
store parking lots. These centers are usually the first recycling step for many 
communities. The provision of drop off sites appeals mostly to those who want to 
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recycle for ethical reasons. For those with no ethical stance on reducing refuse, 
the incentive structure remains the same as for no policy. 
Voluntary curbside collection 
Voluntary curbside collection refers to a recyclable collection provided by 
the sanitation company which collects the "regular" trash. The separated items 
are placed on the curb beside the regular collection. Voluntary curbside 
recycling amplifies the impact of voluntary drop-off centers. Still voluntary yet 
without direct appeal to economic incentives, the voluntary curbside collection 
method generates a cost to the individual, i.e., time and effort, reduction. This 
will impact those predisposed to recycle, more than those who are indifferent to 
recycling. 
Mandatory curbside collection 
A most dramatic approach to recycling is to mandate curbside recycling. 
Mandatory curbside collection would require a penalty for non-recyclers. 
Possibly, a fine levied or the trash not taken away. In order to be effective, the 
fine needs to exceed the costs of recycling so that it becomes in each person's 
individual interest to participate. Also, the probability of receiving the fine for 
not participating must be fairly certain, so the policy would reduce the number of 
nonrecyclers. 
Volume based pricing plus voluntary curbside collection 
The last approach considered here is the voluntary curbside collection plus 
volume based pricing. This is the only policy which directly affects the pricing 
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system. The first three policies described above would charge a flat fee 
unrelated to the amount of garbage collected. Volume based pricing uses a lower 
flat fee to cover the fixed costs then adds an additional charge per unit collected. 
When combined with a "free" curbside collection ofrecyc1ables, the idea is for 
citizens to shift recyclables out of the charged unseparated collection and into 
the "free" recyclable collection. 
This policy is structured to be a self-enforcing version of mandated 
recycling. Self-enforcing policies do not require mandate enforcement, rather, 
the price structure is expected to lead people to compliance. The changes in the 
pricing system itself, rather than the external price of a fine, are the impetus to 
reduce refuse. The strength of the incentive will vary as the price per unit varies 
filling the "incentive space" between voluntary curbside and mandatory curbside. 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
In most cases the prerequisite for social gains is the identification, not of villains 
and heroes but of the deficits in the incentive system that drive ordinary decent 
citizens into doing things contrary to the common good. 
The incentive system can be defined as the system of costs and benefits 
that each individuals face when making a decision. When the individual's 
mirrored costs and benefits are not true reflections, then there is a defect in the 
incentive system. This false reflection is common in environmental issues. 
Literature on the use of incentives in recycling policy is extensive. 
Incentives are classified as extrinsic, intrinsic, or social. Extrinsic incentives 
offer external rewards or benefits for certain behavior, e.g., participation in a 
recycling program. Luyben and Bailey (1979) found offering prizes to be 
effective; Jacobs' and Bailey's (1982) lottery eligibility increased participation; 
while, Witmer and Geller (1976) considered prompts, raffies and contests. These 
incentives are often criticized because once removed, recycling ceases (Couch et 
al.1979; Luyben and Bailey 1979, Geller, Winett, and Everett 1982). Deci (1975) 
called this the "over justification effect." In essence, he says, the participants 
recycled for the external incentive without shifting to a intrinsic satisfaction. 
Intrinsic incentives are more attitudinal, personal, even moral in nature. 
Altruism (Hopper and Nielsen 1991, Davidson-Cummings 1977) and intrinsic 
satisfaction, or feeling good about what one has done, (Oskamp et a11991, De 
Young 1986, Hopper and Nielsen 1991) are but two examples. These attitudes, 
however, are difficult to measure and attempts to measure any underlying 
pro environment factor have been unsuccessful (Cook and Berrenberg 1981, 
Tracy and Oskamp 1983-1984). The situation is complicated further by the lack 
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of consistency between revealed attitudes and corresponding behaviors (Oskamp 
et al1991, Vining and Ebreo 1990). 
A second facet of intrinsic incentives reflects social influences or 
incentives. These affect one's image or reputation via desired family and/or 
neighbors' perceptions of one evaluated against "community" standards and 
norms (Vining and Ebreo 1990). Thus where there is general community 
support for recycling, each individual, wanting to belong, also will support 
recycling (McGuiness, Hones, and Cole 1977). The impact is greater for curbside 
collection programs, making participation obvious to all (Vining and Ebreo 1990, 
Burn 1991, Oskamp et a11991, Cook and Berrenberg 1981). 
The approach to extrinsic or material incentives in the literature, is not 
the lead which I follow in this paper. Their approach appears almost trivial and, 
I believe to be, off the mark, betraying a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
problem. First, landfill life extension, the ultimate purpose for recycling, can be 
achieved only through the collective effort of the individuals of the community. 
However, citizen options and perceptions were not examined nor were they 
forced to reevaluate them themselves. When attempts have been made to 
examine and alter perceptions and options in significant ways, e.g., through the 
use of either intrinsic or social incentives, the long-term success rate improved 
dramatically over external incentives (DeYoung 1986, Burn 1991). 
Additionally, landfill use has been undervalued. This undervaluation is 
demonstrably evident when one considers the size of the federal superfund 
program to clean hazardous landfills or the political, social, and real costs of 
choosing a new landfill site. Are these costs included in most garbage bills? The 
difference between garbage bills (private costs) and the superfund program 
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(social costs) should be the crux of external incentives. The extrinsic, economic 
incentive should reflect garbage's true cost to society, rather than a gimmick to 
induce recycling. The process of shifting the social cost of garbage disposal not 
included in the private cost to the individual is called internalizing the 
externality. Internalization represents a pricing system change. 
Pricing system changes directly address this undervaluation (Schelling 
1984, Baumol and Oates 1988). Often pricing system corrections are themselves 
called incentives. There are several advantages to internalizing these social, 
public costs. First, by introducing the true costs to each individual, the 
increased costs of the behavior should effectively reduce the quantity of that 
behavior, thus, mediating the impact before it occurs. Secondly, it is appropriate 
that the costs of mediation should be paid by those who negatively impact the 
environment, rather than an even distribution of those costs across society 
through public costs paid through tax revenues (Schelling 1983). 
This pricing system perception of incentives is common in economics. The 
discussion usually is carried out in terms of either industries and firms or 
individuals and collective action problems, although the division is not 
necessarily rigid (Schelling 1983). The industry and firm discussion relies 
heavily on the functioning of the market and purely economic (price changing) 
incentives. Assuming firms and industries maximize their profits, an alteration 
to the costs which affect the bottom line, incentives, induces a change in 
behavior (Baumol and Oates 1988). The firm must pay a higher price to 
continue its harmful activity. 
Pricing system alterations translate into individual decision making in the 
following way. The market functions based on an assumption that individuals 
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make decisions which maximize their interests. Through an incentive, or change 
in the pricing system, environmentally aware behavior is in the interest of each 
citizen. "We need not actually forbid a citizen to [do something]; we merely 
make it increasingly expensive for him to do so. Not prohibition, but carefully 
biased options are what we offer him" (Hardin 1968, 1247). 
Beyond strictly economic or monetary incentives, Olson (1971) takes a 
broader approach. He does not limit private interest to Schelling's narrower 
economic vision: "Economic incentives are, to be sure, not the only incentives" 
(Olson 1971,60). Olson's incentives, "selective incentives," provide benefits 
which are received if and only if one participates in collective action. Beyond 
economic (or monetary) incentives social incentives such as prestige and status 
are selective, as are moral incentives. "Even in the case where moral attitudes 
determine whether or not a person will act in a group-oriented way, the crucial 
factor is that the moral reaction serves as a 'selective incentive' "(Olson 1971, 
61). Social incentives or sanctions describe conventions shared within a group, 
the sanction reinforces the convention and vice versa. These are most effective 
when the conventions are clear and members of the group are sensitive to those 
standards (Reisman 1990). 
Olson (1971) defines three groups distinguished by their ability to provide 
themselves with a collective good. He refers to the group (possibly a subset of a 
larger group, or not) which provides itself the collective good, whether or not 
anyone else contributes, a privileged group. The second group, the intermediate 
group, is not so small that it can provide the good independently, but is not so 
large that its contribution to the provision of the collective good goes unnoticed 
by the other members of the group. In this case, social incentives have a greater 
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impact than in the largest, latent group. In the latent group each individual's 
contribution and its impact goes unnoticed and unnoticeable by other members 
of the group. However, this group, due to its size, has the greatest "latent" 
potential for collective provision of the good. 
Using game theory, it becomes possible to analyze social situations to 
determine to which group the players belong. The Olsonian privileged group is 
redefined because of the interesting distinction between some and all members 
providing the collective good. When all members provide the collective good, the 
group is called fully privileged, when at least one member provides the collective 
good, the group is called privileged. The latent group still refers to the situation 
where no one participates in the public good provision. 
Despite the variety of approaches to recycling incentives, the literature 
appears to side-step the critical pricing issue. Economists address pricing issues, 
but usually in terms of industrial situations. As a result, the pricing aspect of 
local government issues, such as refuse disposal, has.not been explored 
explicitly. It is this which I seek to explore. When public policy addresses 
collective goods issues, it happens on to behavior patterns that resemble players 
in a game. The bridge between public policy and game theory is built on 
interdependent decision process (e.g., "I will if you will," and "I know that you 
know that I know, etc."). The players in a collective action game can be 
categorized into Olsonian groups. In the section which follows, some of the basic 
ideas mentioned thus far, game theory, collective action games, rationality, will 
be explored. The exploration will conclude with a summary in terms of the 
propositions which can be made about the impact of recycling policies on citizen 
participation and successful landfill life extension. 
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CONCEPTS AND THEORIES 
Game theory represents a methodology for objectively analyzing a social 
situation. Game structures are superimposed on a social situations. Without 
government intervention, the refuse reduction problem would appear as what 
game theorists call a Prisoner's Dilemma situation. Since the purpose of 
recycling policy is to give citizens the opportunity to reduce their refuse~ the 
policy game requires a shift in the cost-benefit structure to a Fully Privileged 
game. The citizens make their decision--whether to recycle or not--based on 
their rationality and the policy structure, not formally based on any knowledge 
of collective action problems or solutions. With this framing of the social 
situation, I turn first to game theory and then rationality. 
Game Theory 
In order to discuss game theory, it is first necessary to define a game. Ken 
Binmore states: "A game is being played by a group of individuals whenever the 
fate of an individual in the group depends not only on his own actions but also on 
the actions of the rest of the individuals in the group" (1990, 1). The essence is 
dependent interactions between two or more persons; the implication is a 
framework for the analysis of these strategic (dependent) decisions. The use of 
the word "game" does not limit its application to the trivial or merely 
entertaining; rather, "game" is used in the sense of rules, strategies, and 
preferences of outcome, also when each player knows each other's options and 
preferences (Schelling 1988). Clearly, many social situations fit into this 
description of "game." 
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Dependent decisions resemble crystals which must be reduced to their 
simplest pattern to be fully understood and amenable to manipulation. The first 
step towards understanding is to rid dependent social situations of all but detail 
relevant to the decision at hand. "[Game theorists] are simply attempting to 
separate those features of a problem that are susceptible to uncontroversial 
rational analysis from those that are not" (Binmore 1992, 4). By focusing only on 
those aspects of the problem which factor into the decision process, one may 
avoid many of the emotional and moral questions which "muddy the water." 
Sidestepping these questions is appropriate since the analysis is of the situation 
and not of the individuals (Schelling 1988). A different question of what criteria 
individuals use in the decision process is a rationality assumption question. 
Game theorists assume that players optimize or maximize their outcomes. 
Implicit assumptions of player rationality and perfect knowledge of all options 
round out the self-interested economic man. Such an assumption does not 
restrict one from varying the goals of the economic man, and therefore his 
rationality. As discussed earlier, attitudes and preferences are part of the 
situation and "game theory takes them as data" (Schelling 1984,216). 
The game model employed is based on the player's strategy choice. 
Strategies embody all decisions necessary for one player to finish a game. Thus, 
the games are presented in normal, bimatrix form, that is, in matrix form where 
each cell contains two payoff entries. The strategy choices for each player define 
the rows or columns. Within each cell of the resulting matrix are the payoffs for 
that strategy combination. It is these payoffs which the players seek to 
maximize. 
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In game theory there are a few things which must be explicit before 
beginning. These "rules of the game" include defining the players, the rules of 
the game, information available to each player, and the consequences of that 
action for all (Harsanyi 1977, 88). These plus the rationality assumptions 
combine to form the game theory model. 
In the examination of the impact of recycling policies on refuse reduction, 
I analyze how the policies affect the "everyman" individual decision maker, that 
is, on the assumption that community reduction is the aggregation of individual 
reductions, the community-wide effective polices will be those which alter or 
appeal to each individual. Thus, the players of the game are everyman and 
everywoman.1 The individual decision maker has only two strategies, to recycle 
or to not recycle. The players need only know which policy operates in their 
community and what the procedures for compliance are, I assume that both 
players are capable recyclers. The consequences of recycling or not correspond to 
the payoffs and these are known by all players. 
As discussed at length above, rationality assumptions form the core of a 
decision-making model. In this analysis I use'two sets of rationality 
assumptions (see below). The first is a short-term biased, calculative rationality; 
the second, conservationist rationality, is a long-term biased, consequentialist 
rationality. Common to both are a knowledge of the rules of the game, 
knowledge of each other's preferences, and a decision process whereby each 
player attempts to maximize her payoffs. 
lor course communities have more than two individuals, however, the purpose of this model is to 
simplify the system, then later, add the complexities of the real world. 
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Collective action games 
Collective action situations are common in social arenas. So common that 
the general structures have been modeled as games (Mueller 1989, Sandler 
1992a, 1992b, McLean 1987, Reisman 1990, Axelrod 1984). Each situation's 
structure is different (and there are many more structures not included here), 
altering the likelihood of public good provision and the solution to that provision 
problem. In order to emphasize the structural differences among the situations 
the games will be presented with ordinal payoffs or rankings where 4 is the best 
and 1 is the worst. Within each cell of the matrix the left-hand numbers belong 
to the row person and the right-hand numbers belong to the column person. In 
this analysis I choose three games as examples of the basic situations in 
collective action. The situation which is least likely to result in public good 
provision is called Prisoner's Dilemma, then Chicken, and finally Fully 
Privileged where it is most likely to develop (Sandler 1992a). Each game has its 
own story and special characteristics. While going through the games, I will 
introduce several ideas basic to any discussion of games. 
Prisoner's Dilemma 
The most discussed and analyzed game in political science is Prisoner's 
Dilemma. The story line revolves around two prisoner's who must decide 
whether or not to confess to a crime. The police set the stage, telling each that if 
she confesses and the other does not then they will let her off with a light 
sentence and throw the book at the other person. However, ifboth confess there 
will be a moderate sentence for each, and if neither confess then they will be 
convicted of a lesser crime. The ordinal payoff is in Figure 1. 
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Each prisoner reasons, "it is best if I confess and you don't, second best if 
we both don't confess, then if we both do confess, and worst of all for me if I don't 
confess and you do" (McLean 1987). It is the goal of each player to choose a 
strategy which is the best for her no matter what the other prisoner does, a 
dominant strategy. Dominance means that the payoff's of one strategy are 
greater than the corresponding payoff's of all other strategies, given the 
opponent's strategy choices. 
prisoner 2 
don't confess confess 
don't confess 3, 3 1, 4 
prisoner 1 
* 
confess 4, 1 2, 2 
. , . . FIgure 1. Collective actIOn games: Pnsoner s DIlemma (ordinal ranking: 4IS 
best, 1 is worst) 
Examining prisoner l's choices, if prisoner 2 does not confess then if 
prisoner 1 confesses she gets 4 or if she does not, 3. Confessing is the preferred 
choice. Ifhowever, prisoner 2 does confess, then prisoner 1 can either not 
confess and get 1 or confess and receive 2. Again the better choice is to confess. 
Since, given either of the opponent's choices, confessing yields the greater payoff' 
(4)3,2>1) prisoner l's dominant strategy is to confess. Both prisoner's will 
reason to the same conclusion, both will confess, and both will receive 2 (this cell 
is marked with an asterisk, *). Collective action, in the sense of working 
together for a preferred outcome, both not confessing, does not materialize. In 
Olsonian terms, the prisoners are members of a latent group. Because neither 
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sees her own contribution to be worth the cost of silence (not confessing), neither 
contributes, both are worse off. 
Chicken 
In the game of Chicken, with the story line from James Dean's Rebel 
. without a Cause, collective action is a life or death decision. In a dare of nerves, 
two players driving for a head-on collision where each rebel can either swerve or 
not swerve her car before crashing. The players reason, "My best situation is for 
the opponent to swerve while I don't, second best if we both swerve, then that I 
alone swerve, and worst if we both don't swerve and crash." The ordinal ranking 
is in Figure 2. 
rebel 2 
don't swerve swerve 
a b * don't swerve 3,3 2, 4 
rebel 1 
* c d 
swerve 4, 2 1, 1 
Figure 2. Collective action games: Chicken (ordinal ranking: 4 is best, 1 is worst) 
In the analysis for dominant strategy we see that for rebel 1 if rebel 2 
swerves it is best not to swerve (2)1); but, if rebel 2 doesn't swerve it is best to 
swerve (4)3). Since the strategy choice for rebel 1 changes, as rebel 2 changes 
her choice, there is no dominant strategy. Without a dominant strategy, there is 
a broader solution mechanism: Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is a 
strategy combination from which neither player will voluntarily change 
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strategies (a dominant strategy is also a Nash equilibrium, although not vice 
versa). Each cell represents a different strategy combination and must be 
examined for each player's strategy choice. In cell "a" (don't swerve, don't 
swerve) rebell prefers swerve to don't swerve (4)3) as does rebel 2 (4)3) and 
each unilaterally will change (change assuming the other player's strategy choice 
is given); therefore, cell a is not a Nash equilibrium. Cells band care 
symmetric, so only one needs to be examined. Cell b represents rebell not 
swerving and rebel 2 swerving. The alternate choice for rebell, swerve, yields a 
lower payoff (1 <2), she will not want to move. For rebel 2, a change to don't 
swerve would also decrease her payoff (3<4), therefore, she does not change. 
Neither rebel will change, therefore, cell b (and cell c) is a Nash equilibrium. 
Since cell d represents the worst payoff for both rebels each will want to change, 
thus, it is not a Nash equilibrium. Collective action materializes in cells band c 
but is provided by only one player. 
Unlike Prisoner's Dilemma where no collective action is an acceptable 
solution for the players, avoiding the worst payoff; in Chicken games this is the 
worst possible outcome for both players. The costs of both doing nothing are 
large enough that at least one person will cooperate to avoid the crash. In 
Olsonian terms, Chicken players are members of a privileged group. At least one 
member will provide the collective good; yet, each would rather not be the 
provider. 
FUlly Privileged 
The Fully Privileged game gets its name from Olson's privileged group. 
The distinction "fully" means that all members of the organization or society 
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trying to provide a collective good will cooperate. In order to be Fully Privileged, 
all participants must have a dominant strategy to cooperate. In Figure 3, the 
ordinal payoffs reveal the structure of the game. 
In this study, public good provision is assumed to fit into a Prisoner's 
Dilemma structure. As society identifies the pubic goods it wishes, wants, or 
needs to provide itself, which in this case is refuse reduction, the community 
seeks to move itself out of a Prisoner's Dilemma and into a Fully Privileged 
structure. A policy which falls short of Fully Privileged may create a Chicken 
game. These games serve as the standards against which I will evaluate the 
effectiveness of the policies. 
Person 2 don't 
cooperate cooperate 
cooperate * 4, 4 2, 3 
Person 1 
don't 3,2 1, 1 
cooperate 
. FIgure 3. Collective actIon games: Fully PnVlleged COrdmal rankings: 4IS best, 
1 is worst. 
Within the evaluative process, one must consider the individual decision 
making process. As a framework for modeling this process, game theory makes 
certain assumptions about human rationality. However, human rationality is 
not a singular phenomenon, it may be as varied as are people. Even so, there are 
some basic characteristics which can be generalized and used as assumptions of 
rationality. 
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Rationality 
Garret Hardin (1968) popularized the basic environmental management 
problem in his The Tragedy of the Commons. The environment is a commons, 
that is, for the most part all people or groups of people have equal access to the 
environment (Sandler 1992a). It is in each person's best interest to maximize his 
utility of the commons. As all other people also maximize their utility, the 
commons may be destroyed. Hardin put it eloquently, 
Each man is locked into a system that compels him to increase his [use of 
the commons] without limit--in a world that is limited. Ruin is the 
destination toward which all men rush, each pursuing his own best 
interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the commons (Hardin 
1968,1244). 
The tragedy is a result of both the system and the rationality of the 
commons users. The individual rationalities do not reflect the needs of the 
collective, that is, the aggregated individual rationalities are not collectively 
rational. The self-interested maximization of utility is but one definition of 
individual rationality emphasized in economics. In other disciplines, such as, 
sociology, political science, or psychology, rationality is defined as goal-oriented 
behavior (Simon 1946). It is the nature of the goal which determines what is 
rational. When self-maximization is the goal, economic rationality is the basis of 
decisions. Ifhonesty and goodness in relationships are the goal then moral 
rationality (or value maximization) will be the foundation. In the examination of 
recycling, if responsibility to society both present and future is the goal then 
tapping economic, moral, and collective rationality is appropriate. Any situation 
may appeal to various individual rationalities. 
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The questions for policy formulators to address are to which rationality 
does their rationality appeal? To which are they trying to appeal? How can the 
appeal to individual rationalities lead to a collectively rational outcome? Public 
policy makes assumptions about human behavior. The literature discusses at 
least three models of rationality. Each rationality reacts differently to the same 
policy; thus, similar policies can lead to a variety of outcomes. The two 
individual rationalities explored and then used as the decision-making 
foundation in the games analysis are economic and ethical. Collective 
rationality is explored as a basis for evaluating the effectiveness of the policies' 
appeal to individual rationalities. 
Economic rationality 
Economic rationality is a consequentialist theory. Unlike moral theory 
which is based on the rightness or wrongness of the action, classical economic 
rationality is based on the expected utility2 of an action. Kristen Monroe 
outlines seven basic assumptions of economic rationality: 1) actors pursue goals, 
2) these goals reflect the actor's perceived self-interest, 3) behavior results from 
conscious choice, 4) the individual is the basic actor in society, 5) actors have 
preference orderings that are consistent and stable, 6) if given options, actors 
choose the alternative with the highest expected utility, and 7) actors possess 
extensive information on both the alternatives and the likely consequences of 
their choices (Monroe 1991, 78). These assumptions form the basis of utility 
analysis and all classical economics. Even broader Olson states, "Economic (or 
2Utility analysis is quite different from utilitarianism. Mill's utilitarianism is a moral theory 
which defines right action as that which yields the greatest benefit to the greatest number of 
people (greatest social benefit). Utility analysis has no such social impact and guides the 
behavior of the individual in terms of only what is best for him or herself. 
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more precisely micro economic) theory is in a fundamental sense more nearly a 
theory of rational behavior than a theory of material goods (Olson 1969,146)." 
In this sense economic rationality is synonymous to calculative rationality 
(Reisman 1990). Calculative because of the calculation and weighing of costs 
and benefits as a basis of decision-making. 
Several of the assumptions of calculative rationality, are demanding of 
human cognitive abilities, such as, knowledge of consequences of actions and of 
the expected utilities of all possible actions. Many scholars shrink away from 
accepting such assumptions. Herbert Simon (1946) suggests a "bounded 
rationality" as more realistic. He outlines several factors limiting human 
abilities: (1) "skills, habits, and reflexes no longer in the realm of consciousness," 
(2) "his values and those conceptions of purpose which influence him in making 
his decisions," (3) "the extent of his knowledge of things relevant" (161). Thus, 
Simon leads us to believe that people make decisions on the basis of "bounded 
rationality," and attempt to satisfice rather than maximize (Simon 1957). While 
granting these, John Harsanyi (1977) states that the economic rationality 
assumptions yield good predictions over a wide range of social situations. 
Answering the question of why these assumptions provide good predictive 
results, Binmore (1992) suggests that most social situations are repeated and 
lend themselves to learning what is needed to function rationally. Beyond all 
this, the assumptions continue to be made and used because they are "simple 
and unambiguous (Schelling 1988, 239)," the goal of any model. 
There is still another facet of economic rationality, the intertemporal 
value of utilities. Due to the possibility of investments and opportunity costs, 
future costs and benefits are worth less today, that is, the future is discounted. 
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Discounting is based on a given rate of return. One who is oriented towards the 
present will require a higher rate of return in order to invest in or worry about 
the future. While, one who values the future, will accept a lower rate of return. 
The difference being that the future oriented person perceives less difference 
between present and future costs and benefits than does the present oriented 
person. 
The calculative person takes Schelling's approach to the market world. 
Costs and benefits acknowledged are narrowly economic and monetary. Their 
consideration is for the goal of self-regarding maximization of utility. From 
social and moral incentives one derives neither costs nor benefits. Finally, 
future values are highly discounted so as to have almost negligible present 
value. 
Ethical rationality 
Ethical or moral rationality is based on moral theory. There are many 
theories but all aim to provide principles or norms of right behavior and of 
valuation. Principles of right behavior guide actions and thoughts. Theories of 
valuation set standards and guidelines as to what states, things, or properties 
are intrinsically valuable. The value can be either of a moral or nonmoral value. 
Moral value expands the class of things to which one has a moral obligation. 
There are two general approaches to moral theory, the difference is the 
importance of the effect of the action. Consequentialist or teleological theory 
judges value on the result of the action, whether or not it produces or maintains 
something which has been defined to be valuable. Deontological theories assess 
the rightness of the action based on qualities inherent in the action itself. Out of 
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moral theory flow normative ethics. Ethics have been traditionally human-
centered or at least heavily human oriented, valuation based on its relationship 
with man. This leads to a predominately economic or utility based value.3 
Advances in ecology demonstrating the interdependence of man and nature 
render the economic approach untenable if man is dependent upon parts of 
nature for which there is no economic value. It is from this dependence that the 
call for a new environment ethic springs. 
A new ethical theory rejecting the anthropocentric view of traditional 
ethical theories in favor of a ecocentric (nature-centered) approach, accords man 
the status of "just another species," then seeks to determine values and 
standards for human behavior. This new environmental ethic must define what 
is to be valued. It is here that the road forks for types of environmental or 
conservation ethics. There are three basic positions which lie along a continuum 
from an ecocentric ethic to an anthropocentric attitude. Along the same lines, 
the continuum moves from the intrinsic value of nature to an ascribed value of 
nature (see Figure 4). 
Ethical position 
Ecocentric ethic Conservation attitude 
Intrinsic 
.. 
Valuation basis of nature 
Ethical Preservationist 
. Ethical Conservationist 
Figure 4. Environmental ethic spectrum 
Ascribed 
• 
Conservationist 
3A1though utilitarian theory does not limit valuation to economic utility, this has been the 
historical paradigm. 
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At the left end of the spectrum are the ethical preservationists,4 
ecocentrists who, due to the interdependence of all living and non-living forms 
and systems, conclude that all of nature is intrinsically valuable. As such, all of 
nature is ascribed moral worth. In the middle are the ethical conservationists. 
While remaining anthropocentric, they acknowledge the full range of value in 
nature from its instrumental to existence value. These ethical conservationists 
call for a new normative ethic based on environniental needs and the obligations 
nature incurs upon man. Finally, on the right are the conservationists. The 
distinction between this group and the former is the call for an ethic. This last 
group calls only for a reexamination of the implication of traditional ethics as it 
relates to the environment.5 
In addition to generally guiding behavior, Thompson (1990, 149-150) lays 
out three logical, formal requirements of an "ethic": consistency, nonvacuity, and 
decidability. Consistency necessitates that all things alike in important respects 
be judged equally valuable. Nonvacuity requires that not all situations or things· 
count as equally valuable; otherwise, there is no basis upon which to choose one 
course of action over another. Thirdly, a decision must be made. It must be 
possible to distinguish what is valuable and what is not. 
The "intrinsic," ecocentric valuation of nature by the preservationists 
leads to many definitions and schema (see Leopold 1966, Routley and Routley 
1980, Taylor 1986). Generally these schema suffer from generality and 
vagueness; thus, violating the resolvability requirement. For example, Leopold 
4The labeling of these groups was inspried by Pearce and Turner, p.228-230. 
50ff the scale to the right are the exploiters. This group sees nature as a resource to be used and 
conquered. They can be seen as the foil for the rest of the spectrum. 
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(1966) , author of the seminal preservationist work Land Ethic, values that 
which maintains, "integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community" (262). 
Yet, by not defining terms nor outlining a ranking scheme his standards are 
rendered vacuous in application. 
Conservation ethicists, while still calling for a new environmental ethic, 
take a different approach. Rather than an ethic starting from scratch based on a 
novel, ecocentric valuation, this ethic is based on traditional, anthropocentric 
ethical theory extended and expanded to include environmental impacts and 
obligations. The moral community is expanded to include sentient animals. The 
difficulty with this approach is in the third requirement of decidability. Without 
an explicitly ranking the species, there is no guidance in difficult cases, for 
example, what is the moral decision when the needs of a dog and a cat, cow, or 
dolphin come into confrontation? There is no way to choose between them as 
equal members ofa moral community. 
Finally, there are those who do not call for an ethic. H.J. McCloskey 
explains this position: "[T]here is no need for a specifically ecological ethic to 
explain our obligations toward nature ... [E]cology bears on ethics and morality in 
that it brings out the far-reaching, extremely important effects of man's actions, 
that much that seemed simply to 'happen' is due to human actions that are 
controllable, preventable, by man and by men, and hence such that men can be 
held accountable for what occurs" (McCloskey 1983,31). Here man's needs come 
first but must be balanced against the immediate and long-term consequences. 
There are several assumptions which one can make about the positions 
which a conservationist will hold. First, the future will be less discounted. The 
consequentialist assumption coupled with acknowledgment of environmental 
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impacts requires one to take responsibility for one's actions which impact into 
the future as if they are cumulatively impacting the present. As a result, 
conservationists take seriously their inter-generational, inter-temporal 
obligations. Secondly, in line with the interdependent nature of all life, a 
conservationist accepts a communal responsibility for environmental protection .. 
Finally, a conservationist derives moral or conscience benefits from 
environmentally sensitive behavior; thus, she will act accordingly even when the 
economic incentives favor environmentally damaging behavior. 
Collective rationality 
"A public good, roughly speaking, is a good that can be produced only by 
collective action, but its production benefits people regardless of whether they 
join in the collective effort. Such collective action as is necessary to provide 
public goods is collectively rational in a straightforward sense. Even so, it is not 
individually rational for people to voluntarily to do their part to secure a 
collectively rational outcome" (Schmidz 1991, 1, emphasis in original). 
Collectively rational refers to the ability of a group to be "goal-oriented" toward 
ends which benefit the whole. 
Basic ideas about collective rationality revolve about the role of 
individuals. Should individual rationalities be aggregated for a social 
preference? Or is social rationality distinct from individual rationality?6 Adam 
Smith (1937) professes the aggregation of individual preferences, that all people 
6A standard against which one can evaluate social preferences is pareto optimality. A pareto 
optimal outcome is one where no one person can be made better off without making another 
person worse off. In terms of social choice a pareto optimal choice is one where if everyone 
prefers apples to oranges then society prefers apples to oranges. Its importance is that society 
should choose that solution in which everyone is best off as a whole. 
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working for their "own gain," inadvertently but surely, will be "led by an 
invisible hand to promote ... the public interest" (1937, 423). There are, however, 
problems with this theory. Arrow's general impossibility theorem show that 
summation of preferences across individuals leads to a cycle where the result 
varies with the choice of vote order, i.e., is in essence random (Plott 1976, 97-98). 
Plott (1976) explains that the transfer of individual preferences to collective 
preferences is a "classic fallacy of composition," and claims that the whole idea of 
social preferences "must go" (109). 
He turns to a social rationality distinct from the individuals who compose 
the society: social welfare functions. These functions are analogous to individual 
utility functions, outlining the variables which affect social choices. The classic 
Bergson-Samuelson social welfare function is; 
W=W(zl' z2' ... ,zn), 
. , 
where W is the value of the function and zis represent the variables which affect 
social welfare (Mueller 1989,373). This function assumes society should 
maximize its welfare as an individual maximizes her utility. 
Collective rationality springs from two possible sources: one, an 
aggregation of the individuals or, two, a distinct axiomatic choice mechanism. 
Ideally, public policy should represent social preferences seeking to maximize 
social welfare. While the policy selected is itself a social choice, as a given it can 
provide direction to individuals making decisions about personal behavior 
having collective impacts. Hardin (1968) suggests "mutual coercion, mutually 
agreed upon," as the basis of commons regulating public policy. 
In the discussion of the commons, collective rationality leads to an escape 
from the tragedy of the commons. In a larger sense this whole paper discusses 
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one path to collective rationality. A model of the interaction of individual and 
collective rationalities, distinct yet related phenomena, will help structure this 
discussion (see Figure 5). Public policy structures the interactions of individuals. 
This interaction is the basis of society. The way in which these relationships 
develop ultimately determines collective rationality (collective action) or 
collective irrationality (collective failure). The relationship between individuals 
and the collective, on a common resource issue such as refuse, is direct. The 
aggregation of individual behavior is the collective behavior, as such, I tum to 
Smith's aggregation ofindividual preferences but without his invisible hand. 
Rather there is a visible hand of public policy which links individual and 
collective rationality, so that the individually rational is also the collectively 
rational. A policy which does not link the individual to the collective will n9t be 
collectively rational. 
.-----1: PUBLIC POLICY :1-------, 
Individual rationality 
1 
Collective rationality 
Figure 5. Collective rationality model 
~ Collective action 
(link made) 
La..... Collective failure 
~ (link not made) 
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Because collective goods are available to all, it may be necessary to establish the 
link by appealing to private benefits, Le., use Olsonian selective incentives. In a 
sentence, public good provision must be in society's private interest. 
In the discussion of rationalities, two basic distinctions have been made, 
individual and collective, and within individual, economic and ethical. The 
individual/collective distinction embodies the tension which creates the tragedy 
of the commons. Escape lies in the linkage of the individual to the collective. In 
the analysis ,which follows the individuals are analyzed in terms of their 
rationalities, but the standard for success will be in terms of the collective 
rationality of an aggregation ofindividuals. Thus each rationality, individual 
and collective, has a separate role in this paper, individual rationality guides 
decisions within a policy structure and collective rationality is a standard to 
evaluate the effectiveness of the policy itself . 
. Propositions 
The above discussion of rationalities coupled with the analysis of refuse 
reduction as a collective action problem modeled using game theory leads to 
several propositions about the various policy impacts. These propositions 
include the anticipated results of changes in the costlbenefit structure resulting 
from the policy strategy. Along the policy continuum, as the incentive to recycle 
increases so the participation in the program is expected to increase. 
Those using a calculative rationality are expected to be the last to 
participate. These citizens will require options very biased toward recycling. 
Conservationists will be more likely to participate than the calculative citizens, 
requiring the opportunity to recycle rather than strong economic incentives. 
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As this suggests, the type of policy will impact the two rationalities 
differently. Policies which utilize voluntary approaches, without pricing system 
changes (voluntary drop-off centers and curbside collection), shift 
conservationists from the latent to fully privileged groups, while calculative 
citizens remain in the latent group. Other policies, which internalize the 
externalities through either a change in the pricing system for solid waste 
collection (volume based rate) or a penalty price (mandatory separation with 
curbside collection) will shift individuals from membership in the latent groups 
to fully privileged groups. 
In the model formulation in the following section, there will be four games 
which build on the basic two person games. Games which model repeated 
encounters and n-person groups in voluntary curbside policy will result in 
shifting the structure to privileged groups. Also, a model of the situation where 
the two rationalities interact. Using game theory to analyze the basic policy 
strategies allows me to hypothesize how the policies are expected to impact real 
communities facing the real problem of landfill depletion. These models will be 
the foundation for the empirical study of refuse reduction policy. 
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MODELS 
Recycling Policy Model 
Measurement of costs and benefits 
There are two general categories of both costs and benefits: public and 
private. Public costs and benefits are analogous to public goods, in that they are 
nonrlval and nonexcludable. The characteristic most relevant is 
nonexcludability. A public benefit available to one member of the community is 
available to all. A public cost is divided among all members of a community. 
Private costs and benefits are neither shared nor divided with anyone. Each is 
enjoyed or borne by the individual in toto. 
Comparison of costs and benefits is the basis of the decision making 
process. Therefore, it is the relationship between the numbers which is 
important rather than the exact numbers themselves. I begin with this 
statement because the numbers used in this analysis do not represent any single 
unit. The costs reflect the price of garbage collection, the cost of gasoline to drive 
to the recycling center, and the time and effort required to separate trash. 
Benefits can include the extended life of the landfill, a clear conscience, or 
prestige in the neighborhood. As Olson states, "To say that rational decision-
making maximizes 'expected utility' says ... that decision makers take all of their 
objectives, material arid intangible, selfish and altruistic, into account" (1987, 
206; emphasis in original). 
The public benefit of anyone person recycling is set at 5. If any policy 
structure encourages or makes possible an increased amount of recycling per 
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person, then the public benefit also increases. Private benefits considered relate 
to one's feelings about recycling. For some it is assumed that doing something 
about the environment, reducing future public costs, and doing the right thing 
all increase the personal benefit of recycling. For others it is the prestige in the 
neighborhood or status as a recycler which are private benefits (this is relevant 
only in the repeated game). 
Table 1. Costs and benefits for recycling policy games 
Private C(mnp) C(np) Public Private 
Costs Benefits Benefits 
Gamel 
calculative 10 1 5 
conservationist 10 2 1 5 3 
Game 2 
calculative 7 2 5 
conservationist 7 3 1 5 3 
Game 3 
calculative 8 2 40 6 
conservationist 8 3 40+1 6 3 
Game 4 
calculative 6 2 5 
conservationist 6 3 1 5 3 
GSlm~ Q (GSlm~ 4} 
calculative 6 2 5 
conservationist 6 3 1 5 3 
GSlm~ 6 (GSlm~ 2} 
calculative 7 2 5 
GSlm~ Z (Gam~ 2} 
calculative 7 2 5 
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The costs of recycling are private. The exception being when no one 
participates, this could necessitate a new landfill which represents a public cost. 
Across policies, private costs vary by the required time and effort to recycle. 
Across rationalities, these costs vary by futures discounting. Mutual non-
participation costs, c(mnp), that is when no one participate, represent the 
discounted future public costs plus any present penalties for such behavior. 
Government intervention in the siting of a new landfill and, possibly, the 
reclamation of the present landfill represent future public costs. When no one 
participates the probability that these events come to fruition increases, hence, 
the non-zero cost of mutual non-participation. 
A table of the costs and benefits for the seven games is presented in Table 1. 
The discussion of the exact values is included in the individual games. It is 
included here for reference and summary purposes. 
Recycling policy games 
The general recycling story involves two citizens both with the 
opportunity to recycle or not to recycle. As is generally common with pubic 
goods, the cost of cooperation is greater than the benefits of anyone person's 
participation would accrue to herself, hence, the need for cooperative behavior. 
For each policy two game matrices are created: first calculative, then 
conservationist. The payoffs (rather than the ordinal rankings of the collective 
action games) are calculated from the costs and benefits. In each cell, the left-
hand (or first entry) value belongs to the row player (person 1) and the right-
hand (second entry) value belongs to the column player (person 2). 
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Games 1, 2, 3, and 4, are the four policies in game form. Games 5, 6, and 
7, are variations on the original policy games. Game 5 is volume based pricing 
with both rationalities in the same encounter. Game 6 is a repeated version of 
voluntary curbside collection, while, Game 7 is the same game involving an n-
persons group. These last three games are attempts to expand the model to 
more realistic assumptions. 
Game l--General Reeycling Game--Vo[untary drop o(fcenters 
The general game of recycling uses a community with voluntary drop off 
centers. The benefits of voluntary reduction are, say 5, to each person; while its 
costs are 10 for each individual. Ifno one participates, then each individual 
bears the costs of her non-participation which due to discounting remain small, 
say 1. The payoff matrix, Figure 6, develops as follows: ifboth recycle then each 
earn their own and each other's benefits minus their cost of participation, that is, 
(n x b) - cor (2 x 5) - 10 = O. If only one recycles, then the recycler receives the 
benefits of her effort minus her own cost which is (1 x 5) -10 = -5; meanwhile, 
the nonrecycler gets the benefits of the others effort minus her cost or (1 x 5)-0 
or 5. Finally, ifboth choose not to recycle, then both forfeit any benefits and pay 
the costs of mutual non-participation, which is (0 x 5) -1 =-1. 
In this general game, the dominant strategy is to not recycle. For person 
1, if person 2 recycles, not recycling yields the larger payoff (5)0). If person 2 
does not recycle, not recycling is still better for person 1 because -1 is greater 
than -5. The cell which represents the solution to the game is ,marked with an 
asterisk (*). 
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Person2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a b 
0, ° -5 ,5 
PersonI 
c d * 
don't recycle 5, -5 
-1, -1 
FIgure 6. Game 1: calculatIve ratIonalIty (public benefits=5, pnvate costs=IO, 
costs of mutual non-participation (cmnp)=I) *solution 
The rationality assumption above is strictly calculative. If one uses a 
conservation rationality, the individuals' costs and benefits change. Consistent 
with its long-term oriented consequentialist assumptions, this attitude requires 
one to place more value on the future impact of not recycling. Thus, the cost of 
non-participation increases due to the discounting oflikely, although uncertain, 
future events and to the guilt one may feel for nonparticipation. The costs of 
non-participation is 1. Mutual non-participation is the individual costs of 1 plus 
the mutual costs of one, mentioned in the calculative game, for a total of 2. 
While the costs of participation do not change, the individual also will receive 
private benefits as a result of the moral satisfaction of having done the "right 
thing." Assume these private benefits, available only to the recycler, are say, 3. 
Thus in addition to the public benefit of 5 to each player, the recycler can receive 
an extra 3 for a total of 13. The new game matrix is in Figure 7. 
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Person2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a b * 
3,3 -2,4 
Personl 
c * d 
don't recycle 4, -2 
-2, -2 
. FIgure 7. Game 1. conservatIOrust ratIonahty (publIc benefits=5, pnvate 
. benefits=3, private costs=lO, cost ofnp=l, cost ofmnp=3) *solution 
With the introduction of the private benefits, the payoff matrix changes. 
If both recycle, then each earns both the mutual public benefits plus the 
individual private benefit minus the costs ofparticipation, which is (2 x 5) + 3 -
10 = 3. If only one recycles then the recycler receives her public and private 
benefits minus the costs ofparticipation or (1 x 5) + 3 -10 = -2. The nonrecycler 
gets the other's public benefits minus her costs of participation (1 x 5) -1 = 4. If 
neither recycles then each pays the price of mutual noncooperation,(O x 5) - 3 = 
-3. 
In this matrix a dominant strategy does not exist. The solution is 
determined by finding the Nash equilibrium point(s). Beginning with cell a in 
Figure 7, where both recycle, both players would prefer to not recycle ifher 
opponent recycles, hence, both recycling is not a Nash equilibrium point. In cells 
band c, begin with the recycler, she would not want to switch from recycling 
because her payoff would decrease, neither would the non-recycler would not 
want to start recycling. Both are Nash equilibria since neither player 
unilaterally will change strategies. Finally, we turn to cell d. When neither 
recycles, each would prefer, unilaterally, to switch to a recycling strategy in 
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order to receive increased benefits. The Nash equilibria cells are marked with 
an asterisk (*). 
Game 2--Voluntary curbside collection 
Voluntary drop off centers provide opportunity to recycle but no real 
incentives to do so. The next policy within the recycling policy spectrum of 
incentives is voluntary curbside collection. This policy has two significant 
characteristics. First, curbside collection reduces the costs of recycling, no longer 
is it necessary to drive to the center, to use that time and energy. Also, what to 
recycle is the individual's decision, there is no penalty for recycling incorrectly or 
incompletely. Secondly, it becomes possible for everyone in the neighborhood to 
know who is and who is not recycling. While unimportant in a single encounter 
model, this social aspect can impact the repeated situation. 
There are, however, costs associated with curbside collection. There must 
be separate storage containers and area for recyclables. On the whole the time 
and effort reduction, lowers the costs of participation to say, 7. When no one 
participates the cost of mutual non-cooperation increases to 2 to cover the 
additional fixed costs of recycling. As before, the public benefits of recycling are 
5 (see matrix, Figure 8). 
Both players' dominant strategy is to not recycle. When the other player 
recycles, the first is better off not recycling (5 > 3). If the other player does not 
recycle, then the first is at least as well off by not recycling (-2 = -2). The 
addition of a voluntary curbside service has not altered the decision solution of 
those citizens motivated strictly by the economics of the situation, although it 
could if the costs and benefits were different (see summary below). 
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Person2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a b . 
3,3 
-2,5 
Personl 
c d * don't recycle 5, -2 -2, -2 
. . . FIgure 8. Game 2: calculative ratIonahty (pubbc benefits=5, pnvate costs=7, 
costs ofmnp=2) *solution 
," 
As earlier, when the rationality assumptions of the game are changed 
then the payoff matrix and solution to the game change. For conservationists. 
the public benefits of participation are 5. The private benefits of moral 
satisfaction in recycling remain at 3. There are two sources of costs for non-
participation. The first is the guilt due to not recycling, as in Game 1. 1. The 
costs ofmutual non-participation, as for the calculative person, cover the fixed 
costs of the recycling program, 2. The total costs for mutual non-participation 
for the conservationist is thus, 3. The payoff matrix is in Figure 9. 
Per§on2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a * b 6, 6 1, 4 
Personl 
c d 
don't recycle 4, 1 -3, -3 
. . . . FIgure 9. Game 2: conservatlorust rationalIty (pubhc benefits=5, pnvate 
benefits=3, private costs=7, costs ofnp=l, costs ofmnp=3) *solution 
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The dominant strategy changes to recycling. The importance of this 
solution is that each individual is now a privileged group, that is, each individual 
will recycle, or provide the public good, no matter what the other player does. 
When the dominant strategies are to cooperate, each person is a privileged 
group, hence, the structure is called Fully Privileged. 
Game 3--Mandatory curbside collection 
P~r§Qn2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a * b 
4,4 
-2, -34 
Personl 
c d 
don't recycle 
-34, -2 -42, -42 
. FIgure 10. Game 3: calculative rationalIty (publIc benefits=6, pnvate costs=8, 
fine=40, costs of mnp=2) *solution 
Mandatory recycling gains currency in communities where the need to 
recycle is greatest. By mandating recycling the community uses economic 
incentives to attempt to force individuals to recycle. The incentive used here is a 
fine for not recycling. The fine is levied for not recycling. The increased 
pressure on each individual to remove all (or all of certain) recyclables or else be 
fined raises the individual effort,ofrecycling above that of the voluntary curbside 
program. It will not however equal to the drop off center's effort as, it is 
collected at one's curbside and once the process is learned it will require only 
slightly more effort than the voluntary curbside collection. The indiVidual cost of 
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mandatory recycling will be say, 8. The cost of nonparticipation will be the price 
of the fine for non-participation. The fine needs to be large enough to ensure 
that everyone will want to participate, let's say five times the individual cost of 
participation, that is, 40. The public benefit of recycling increases as the volume 
ofunseparated trash per person will decrease when all, even difficult and 
unobvious items, recyclables are removed. The benefits change from 5 to 6. The 
payoff matrix is in Figure 10. The dominant strategy for both is to recycle, 
making the game Fully Privileged. 
P~r1:iQn2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a * b 7, 7 1, -35 
Perl:iQnl 
c d 
don't recycle -35, 1 -43, -43 
. . . FIgure 11. Game 3: conservatIOrust ratIonalIty (publIc benefits=6, pnvate 
benefits=3, private costs=8, fine=40, costs of np=1 , costs ofmnp=3) 
* solution 
Using conservation rationality, the major change in benefits is the 
addition of private benefits, still 3. The guilt attendant to non-participation adds 
to the fine level, increasing the cost of mutual non-participation from 40 to 43. 
The payoff matrix, Figure 11, includes the same cost of participation as 
calculative rationality. The solution to the game is, for the first time, the same 
for both rationalities. 
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Game 4--Voluntary curbside collection with volume based pricing 
None of the preceding policies explicitly uses price changing incentives. 
Volume based pricing means that one's garbage bills reflect the amount of 
unseparated garbage one sends to the landfill. By increasing the amount of 
recyclables one decreases the amount of "regular" trash and thus one's garbage 
bill. This savings indirectly reduces the cost of voluntary recycling. Thus where 
the cost of recycling is 7 for voluntary curbside collection, that same collection 
with volume based pricing is 6. The benefits of recycling and the cost of mutual 
non-cooperation remain the same. The game matrix is in Figure 12. 
Person2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a b * 
4,4 
-1,5 
Person1 
c * d 
don't recycle 5, -1 -2, -2 
. Figure 12. Game 4: calculatIve rationahty (pubhc benefits=5, pnvate costs=6, 
costs of mnp=2) *solution 
This game structure is similar to the drop off center for conservationists. 
Neither game has a dominant strategy and therefore the solution is found using 
Nash equilibria. The equilibria is when only one person recycles. This collective 
action structure is the chicken game. The combination of volume based pricing 
and the conservation rationality shifts the game from two Nash equilibria to a 
dominant strategy of recycle .. And the Chicken game becomes a Fully Privileged 
game (see Figure 13). 
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P~rSQn2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a * b 
7,7 2,4 
Person1 
c d 
don't recycle 4,2 -3,-3 
. FIgure 13. Game 4: conservatIOnIst ratIonahty (pubhc benefits=5, pnvate 
benefits=3, private costs:6, costs ofnp:1, costs ofmnp=4) *solution 
Game 5--Game 4 with both rationalities 
No town or community has a homogeneous decision-making process. 
Some members of the community are calculative while others are 
conservationists. The result is a game (see Figure 14) which is no longer 
symmetric and in which each player must consider the other's rationality as well 
as strategy choices before choosing a strategy. 
In the search for a solution, if either has a dominated strategy, then that 
strategy option is eliminated and the other player chooses her best response to 
the remaining strategy. This process is called iterated dominance. From person 
1 's point of view, knowing that person 2 is calculative she determines whatever 
she (person 1) does, person 2 will do the opposite. This means, person 2 has no 
dominant strategy, and, neither of person 2's strategies can be eliminated. 
Consider person 2's thoughts, she calculates that person 1 has a dominant 
strategy to recycle. Person 2 reasons that her best response to person 1 recycling 
is to not recycle. Thus, the solution is for the conservationist (person 1) to 
recycle and the calculative person 2 to not. 
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P~r~Qn2 {~~I~l!1~ti't:~} 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle a b * 
7,4 2, 5 
PersQn1 
(cQnservatiQnist) 
c d 
don't recycle 5, -1 
-4, -2 
. .. FIgure 14. Game 5: mIxed ratIonalitIes (pubhc benefits=5, pnvate benefits=3, 
private costs=6, conservationist cmnp=4, calculative cmnp=2) *solution 
Game 6--Game 2 in a repeated situation 
This repeated game is built on Game 2 with calculative rationality. Game 
2 was chosen because of its Prisoner's Dilemma structure, the basis of most 
collective action problems. The repeated situation adds the time dimension to 
the discussion. When discussing time-valuations, one immediately considers 
discounting. The discount rate is r and is derived from the formula: r=lI(1+i), 
where i is the interest rate. The costs and benefits of this game are the same as 
Game 2. 
In the nonrepeated games discussed earlier, there were two strategy 
options: to recycle or not to recycle. Now that the players interact more than 
once there is the possibility of changing that strategy during the play. There are 
an infinite number of ways to vary the strategies; but in this analysis, I choose to 
use one varying strategy choice: tit-for-tat. In tit-for-tat (tft), the player recycles 
on the first encounter, on all following encounters, the player matches the 
behavior of her opponent in the previous round. The strategy was developed by 
Anatol Rapoport for a computer tournament of strategies for repeated Prisoner's 
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Dilemma sponsored by Robert Axelrod (1984). Of the submitted strategies, tit-
for-tat won the tournament, that is, while it did not beat the competition (tying 
is its best hope) it remained close in total payoff, and because the tournament 
was scored so that close counted, tit-for-tat beat the other strategy entries (Dixit 
and Nalebuff1991, 107). Because it appears to be the "best" varied strategy, I 
use only this varying strategy. The other two strategy choices also take on a 
temporal dimension. If one chooses the recycle strategy, then this is the strategy 
used in all following encounters. The same is true for not recycling, this is the 
strategy of choice for the entire time of the repeated encounters. 
In a three by three matrix, the solution is sought using an iterated 
dominance approach (see Figure 15). This matrix is symmetric, so a strategy 
which is dominated for person 1 is also dominated for person 2. To read each 
cell, the top entry (slightly to the left of the cell) belongs to person 1, and the 
lower entry (slightly to the right of the cell) belongs to person 2. The payoffs are 
read as follows, when person 1 and person 2 use tit-for-tat each receives 3 on the 
first encounter and a discounted 3 thereafter, hence 3+(311-r). Let's begin with 
person 1 and compare tit-for-tat (tft) with recycle. These two strategy choices 
yield the same payoffs, however, the source of the payoffs is different. Ifperson 
1 uses tft while person 2 uses don't recycle, she receives -2 on the first encounter 
as the only recycler and a discounted -2 thereafter for the mutual non-
participation. When person 1 recycles and person 2 does not, then she receives 
-2 on the first encounter and thereafter as the only recycler. Neither strategy 
choice dominates the other. . 
Next to compare not recycling to recycling (or tft since they are 
equivalent), for person 1. If person 2 does not recycle, then the payoffs are the 
49 
same for either strategy: -2 on the first encounter and -2 thereafter. For a 
recycling person 2, person 1 will prefer to not recycle (5+(51l-r»3+(31l-r)). When 
person 2 chooses tit-for-tat person 1 needs to calculate which payoff is larger. To" 
solve the equation she needs to determine the value ofr for which one cell is 
larger than the other. Assuming that recycling is larger, the equation is as 
follows: 
3rll-r) > 5 + (-2I1-r) 
r> 3/8 " 
When r>3/8, recycling yields the larger payoff. Again there is no dominant 
strategy. Next is the search for a Nash equilibrium(a). 
Beginning again with cell a. Person 1 compares her payoffs in cells a, d, 
and g. Of these no cell is better than a, Person 1 will not change. Person 2 
compares her payoffs in cells a, b, and c, again cell a is at least as good as the 
rest, our first Nash equilibrium point. Next to cell b, person 1 compares cells b, 
e, and h, cell h has the highest payoff, person 1 will shift, this is not a Nash 
equilibrium. In cell e person 1 will again shift to cell h. Cell c represents person" 
1 tft and person 2 not recycling. Actually, if person 2 does not recycle then all 
strategy choices for person 1 are equal (cells c, f, and i). Now we need to analyze 
these cells from person 2's perspective. For person 2 when person 1 does tft, she 
would prefer to also tft or recycle (cells a or b), hence cell c is not an equilibrium 
point. If person 1 recycles, then not recycling is person 2's best strategy, thus 
cell fis a Nash equilibrium point, due to symmetry in the matrix, cell h is also a 
Nash point. Finally, the last cell, cell i. This is where both players do not 
recycle, and this was the solution to the single encounter game. 
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P~r~Qn2 
tft recycle don't recycle 
a * b c 
tft 3rll-r, 3rll-r, 2rll-r, , 
3rll-r 3rll-r 5+{-2I1-r) 
PersQnl 
* d e f 
recycle 3rll-r, 
3rll-r, 
-2rll-r, 
3rll-r 3rll-r 51l-r 
g h * 1 * 
don't 5+{-2I1-r) , 51l-r -2rll-r, 
recycle , 
-2rll-r -2rll-r -2rll-r 
. Figure 15. Game 6: calculabve rabonahty In repeated game (pubhc benefits=5, 
private costs=7, costs mnp=2) *solution 
For both players all do not recycle payoffs are equivalent so there is no cell that 
either player would rather be in, given that the opponent is not recycling. The 
conclusion then is that there are four Nash equilibria points, cells a (tft, tft), f 
and h (one recycles, one does not), and cell i (neither recycles). 
The solution to this game is indeterminate. It is impossible to guess 
which potential solution will chosen by real players. There are several factors 
which could influence the citizens. Because the citizens are interac~ing with 
each other over time social incentives may playa role. Some citizens may want 
to establish a reputation as a "good citizen"{recyclers), others may want to keep 
up with the neighbors and follow their lead (tit-for-tat strategy choosers), others 
may live in a community without much interaction and social incentives play no 
role (maybe not recyclers). 
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The game may have had a more useful solution if the costs and benefits 
had been different. In this game, the unusual situation of having the single 
recycler payoff and the mutual non-participation payoff being the same led to the 
equivalence of the strategy choices for player 1 when player 2 did not recycle. If 
the single recycler received a more negative payoff (or the costs of mutual non-
participation was closer to zero) then the two equilibria where one recycles and 
one does not would not be Nash equilibria. 
Game 7--Game 2 with n persons 
Extending the game to more than 2 persons, more closely reflects the 
interactions of a community. In order to analyze such a game one considers five 
situations: where no other persons participate, where some number (j) minus one 
participate, j participate, j plus one participate, and where everyone else 
participates. This should reflect any possible combinations of persons 
interacting. As was Game 6, this game is based on Game 2, using the same costs 
and benefits. As usual, the search for a solution begins with an exploration for a 
dominant strategy (see Figure 16, Sandler 1992). In this case, not recycling is 
larger by 2 for every combination except ifno one else participates, in which 
case, the two are tied. The dominant strategy is to not recycle. Introducing a 
larger number of people into the game has not changed the outcome, as in the 2 
person game the solution is not recycle, as all players will reason to the same 
conclusion, we have not escaped the Prisoner's Dilemma. The citizens have 
remained in their latent group. 
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Number of cooperators in group besides i 
0 ... j-l J j +1 . .. n-l 
recycle 
-2 ... 5j - 7 5j - 2 5j + 3 . .. 5n -7 
I 
don't -2 ... 5(j - 1) 5j 5(j + 1) . .. 5n- "5 
recyc1e* 
FIgure 16. Game 7: calculatIve rattonahty In an n-person game (pubhc 
benefits=5, private costs=7, costs of mnp=2) *dominant strategy 
Summary of Propositions 
For the policies, it was anticipated that both mandated curbside collection 
and volume based pricing would create privileged groups regardless of the 
rationality. The privileged group would result from voluntary approaches 
including curbside collection and drop off centers for conservationists, leaving 
the calculative citizens in their latent state. When the two rationalities 
anticipate each other's actions, the expectation was for the conservationist to 
recycle and the calculative citizen to let her while she did not recycle. For the 
special games, repeated play and n-person, different results were expected. In 
both cases, examined only under calculative rationality, the voluntary curbside 
collection was expected to shift individuals into cooperation. 
On the whole the expectations were borne out fairly well. For a summary 
of the results see Table 2. The summary table includes the game solutions, their 
structure, and the end game group membership. The recycling game is assumed 
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to be a Prisoner's Dilemma, the impact of the incentives is measured in terms of 
movement towards Fully Privileged games and membership. 
As expected conservationists will generally recycle as long as it is possible 
and certaiilly when it is at all convenient. The impact of incentives on the 
calculative persons mirrors the strength or pointedness of the incentives. As 
expected mandatory recycling shifted even these self-maximizers to independent 
collective action. What did not happen though, was the same shift to fully 
privileged for volume based pricing. Instead an privileged group situation where 
one person recycles was created. 
For the special games the solutions were not as anticipated. For the n-
person game, there was no shift from Prisoner's Dilemma. The repeated game 
yielded an indeterminate solution, either both use tit-for-tat and therefore 
recycle, or both don't recycle, or one recycles and one does not. Even thought, 
Volume based pricing did not shift as was expected. It offers an example of the 
importance of the price. If the price change could have created a large enough 
decrease in the individual's costs the game would have shifted to Fully 
Privileged. The conclusion for a town considering the implementation of price 
changes, is for them to examine the prices and be certain they are affecting the 
intended results. In the case of volume based pricing, the marginal rate for each 
additional bag needed to be large enough that it becomes worth the individual 
effort to reduce the amount of trash. At the same time, there needs to be enough 
revenue for the managing company or agency to cover the long term costs . 
.. ", 
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Table 2. Results 
Game solutions Calculative 
Rationality Game End 
Calculative Conservationist Structure Group 
Gamel no recycling one recycles Prisoner's latent 
Dilemma 
Game 2 no recycling both recycle Prisoner's latent 
Dilemma 
Game 3 both recycle both recycle Fully fully 
Privileged privileged 
Game 4 one recycles both recycle Chicken privileged 
Game 5 conservationist recycles privileged 
Game 6 indeterminate 
Game 7 no recycling Prisoner's latent 
Dilemma 
While all the policy strategies could be used to effectively promote refuse 
reduction through recycling, not all are equally likely to do so. From this fact, a . 
number of hypotheses flow from the game solutions. 
1. Voluntary approaches will lead to less refuse reduction than will 
mandatory or price changing approaches. . 
2. Voluntary curbside collection will lead to a greater reduction in 
landfilled cubic yardage than voluntary drop-off centers. 
3. Whereas the success of a volume based system would depend upon the 
price chosen, this price should make the benefits of recycling (including 
cost savings) greater than the cost ofparticipation. 
4. Mandatory curbside collection and a correctly priced volume based 
pricing system should have the same landfill reduction impact. 
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ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS 
In the previous section games were constructed and analyzed. Based on 
those results hypotheses for policy impact were generated. Data with which to 
test these hypotheses should become available as Iowa's municipalities and 
counties carry out the mandates of the 1987 GPA and 1989 WR-RA. These.. 
policies mandate a 25% reduction in landfilled waste by 1994 and a 50% 
reduction by 2000, over then next few years. However, due to the time lapse 
between mandating, and planning, piloting, and implementing programs is 
short, the data currently available is often inadequate for serious statistical 
analyses. Additionally, many towns and communities have not kept complete 
records to date and are not required to submit "their numbers" to the state until 
1994. Thus; the plethora of anticipated data is not yet available. 
One town for which data is available and which has used two of the four 
policy strategies of this paper is Waverly, Iowa. Waverly uses its own sanitation 
trucks it keeps track of the cubic yardage sent to the landfill, while other towns, 
which contract with private companies, often do not keep the same detailed 
records. Waverly has gone through various planning and implementing stages 
since the 1989 WR-RA. Refuse reduction planning started with a citizen 
organizing board in November 1989. Beginning in January of1990, yardwaste 
was removed from the general collection. The following year, January 1991, the 
voluntary drop-offcenier was opened. Then in January 1992 a volume based 
pricing system was introduced followed in March of that year with a voluntary 
curbside collection program. Since the major policy changes usually were 
instituted on the first of the year, comparing calendar years, rather than fiscal 
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years (July through the following June) is appropriate. The cubic yardage for 
each year, by month, is listed in Table 3. As with the 1989 law, I use 1988 as the 
baseline year. 
Comparing the complete years to each other, 1989 shows virtually no 
change over 1988. This supports the idea that a mandate, state or otherwise, is 
not an effective tool, in and of itself, for collective action. Beginning January 1, 
1990, the WR-RA mandated the removal of yard waste from the landfill waste 
stream. Most of the fifteen percent difference between 1988 and 1990 can be 
attributed to the program to the yardwaste removal. In January 1991, Waverly 
began its own refuse reduction policy, using the first policy discussed in this 
paper, voluntary drop-off centers. This policy cut the landfilled cubic yardage· 
another eight percent. Comparing the first six months of 1992, after the 
introduction of volume based pricing and subsequent voluntary curbside 
collection, the 1988 levels were cut by thirty-eight percent thus far. This puts 
Waverly over the 1994 mandated levels, well on its way to the 2000 goal. 
In order to test the significance of these cuts, I used a paired t-test, 
pairing the months of the year to control for seasonal variations. As outlined 
above, 1990 and 1991 differed significantly from 1988 (p=0.0155 and p=0.0077, 
respectively). However, 1991 (voluntary drop-off center) was not significantly 
different than 1990 (yardwaste removal) as seemed apparent. In April 1991 , 
there was a surge in landfilled waste, due to a city-wide "Clean up Waverly Day," 
city trucks collected anything the citizens put on the curb at no extra charge. In 
1991, it was announced that this would be the last year that such a day would be 
sponsored. It may be that the citizens responded by cleaning out all the "big 
stuff," in any case it may be appropriate to recompare the two years without 
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April. Additionally, January 1991 was the first month of the drop off center. 
The large decrease in volume may be a result of the novelty of the center. 
Without January and April, 1991 is significantly different than 1990 (p=0.0359). 
In order to assess the impact of the 1992 rate based change, I compare 1992 to 
1991. Given that January and April of1991 appear to be outlying values, there 
remain only four months to compare. While this small sample comparison is 
inconclusive, the resulting impression is that the volume based pricing system 
indeed is leading to less landfilled refuse than the voluntary drop off center 
approach alone (p=0.0075). 
The results of the games suggest that the actual price determines the 
success of the volume based system. When the new system was introduced the 
garbage collection rate was $6.95 per month, this changed to $5.00 per month 
plus $1.00 per bag. However, if the volume based system had not been 
introduced, the city would have increased the fixed rate to $9.607 per month. 
Using this value instead of the seven dollars seems the more appropriate 
comparison, a household can put out four and a half bags for the same cost as 
the fixed rate system. The important figure is the dollar per bag. The question 
is if this is a large enough cost savings that some households will view the effort 
of voluntary curbside recycling as worth the dollar per bag not placed on the 
curb. Given this limited sample, the suggested answer is yes. While these 
conclusions are not generalizable beyond Waverly, they do point to some positive 
and anticipated changes resultant from the various policies. 
The results indicate, contrary to my anticipation, that the voluntary drop 
off center does significantly reduce the amount of refuse going to the landfill. 
7The city responded to an increase in the landfills tipping fees. 
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The voluntary approach does appear to have some success in Waverly. There are 
at least two explanations for this: the citizens of Waverly may have a 
conservation ethic, the costs of recycling at a drop off center may be less than I 
anticipated. On top of the impact of the drop off center, the rate based system 
plus the voluntary curbside collection led to a significant decrease in refuse going 
to the landfill. This result was anticipated. 
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Table 3. Waverly, Iowa. Solid Waste Landfill Disposal, Cubic Yardage. 
1987 1988 1989 1990a 1991b 
January 990 1025 1120 630 
February 1000 985 910 870 
March 1290 1120 1090 860 
April 1325 1335 835 1110 
May 1430 1585 1240 905 
June 1100 1350 1065 915 
July 1490 1115 1015 1100 1015 
August 1045 1180 1270 1065 980 
September 1165 1310 1195 895 905 
October 1400 1435 1470 1025 1000 
November 1206 1165 1110 995 880 
December 975 1125 1045 945 950 
Total 14465 14505 12285 11020 
% diff, 1988 0.00 0.28 -15.07 -23.82 
Paired t-value (to '88) -1.09 2.47 2.86 
p value 0.85 0.02* 0.01 *. 
Paired t-value ('91 to '90) 0.91 
p-value 0.19 
Paired t-value ('91 to '90 without April) 2.04 
p-value 0.04* 
Average 1205.42 1205.42 1208.75 1023.75 918.33 
Stand. Dev. 199.46 151.41 194.34 113.54 116.10 
a January 1, 1990-Yardwaste removed. 
b January 1, 1991--Drop off recycling center opened. 
Summer 1991--Corrugated paper collection offered. 
c January 1, 1992--Volume based pricing started. 
March 1, 1992-Voluntary curbside collection offered. 
* Significant at 0.05 level. 
722 
674 
745 
755 
810 
790 
1.22 
0.13 
5.04 
0.01 * 
749.33 
48.59 
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Refuse reduction policy attempts to structure a social situation where 
collective action could mediate the problem, but, as it is in no one's personal self-
interest to participate, collective action does not develop. If policy is collectively 
rational, it will consider the individual rationalities of the community. When 
addressing environmental issues there are basically two rationalities, those who 
consider environmental impacts and those who do not: the conservationists and 
the calculative citizens. The policy which links individual and calculative 
rationality should lead to collective action; otherwise, it will lead to collective 
failure. 
While the policies themselves result from collective choice, for the 
. purposes ofanalysis I have assumed that the policies were given. These policies 
structure the interdependent decisions of society and can be modeled as games. 
Social action situations fit into three common games: Prisoner's Dilemma, 
Chicken, and Fully Privileged. In Prisoner's Dilemma no one contributes to the 
collective good, in Chicken at least one person contributes, and in Fully 
Privileged every person contributes. Loosely corresponding to these games is a 
group taxonomy developed by Mancur Olson (1971). The group in which all 
persons see their contribution to be negligible and unnoticeable, corresponding to 
Prisoner's Dilemma, is called the latent group. When at least one iIi the group 
participates, corresponding to Chicken, there is a privileged group. Finally, the 
situation where each contributes regardless of any other person's actions, both 
the group and the game are called Fully Privileged. 
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The propositions of this study anticipate that the use of incentives will 
change the social situations and therefore the games and therefore the group to 
which the citizens of the community belong. Specifically that incentives will 
shift individuals from latent, non-cooperating groups, to privileged where 
collective action develops, or fully privileged where it is in each person's 
individual interest to act collectively. Also anticipated is that the impact of these 
changes will vary within the community as the rationalities vary. Of the two, 
conservationists were expected to make the transition with less pointed 
incentives. 
These ideas were supported in the game analysis. Assuming a calculative 
rationality voluntary approaches had no impact on recycling participation; 
however, under conservationist rationality some did indeed recycle. The more 
pointed incentive policies had the greater impact on calculative citizens. 
Although the expectation was that the two policies, mandatory curbside and 
volume based pricing, would have the same impact, they did not. The volume 
based pricing created a Chicken game instead of the Fully Privileged of the 
mandatory policy. This result points to the importance of the actual price. 
Towns and communities need to examine the impact of the price to be certain 
that it creates the desired impact. 
In the game theoretic models selected for this study, I arbitrarily chose 
one set of values for the various costs and benefits. Of course, these are not the 
only possible values. In Table 4 the values which would shift any of the four 
games to Fully Privileged are ·presented. To read the table, the values listed in 
the game are listed in the "given" column. Given "calc" refers to the calculative 
rationality, and "cons" refers to the conservationist rationality. 
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Table 4. Price changes to shift games to fully privileged groups. 
Given calca ~bb ~cC ~cnpd Given conse ~b ~c ~cnp 
Game 1: Voluntary Drop-off. 
Private costs 
Public benefits 
Private benefits 
5 
10 
10 
Game 2: Voluntary Curbside Collection. 
Private costs 
Public benefits 
Private benefits 
5 
7 
7 
5 
5 
Game 3: Mandatory Curbside Collection. 
Private costs 
Fine 
Public benefits 
Private benefits 
40 
6 
8 
o 
46 
3 
5 
3 
5 
3 
40 
6 
3 
10 
7 
7 
4 
8 
o 
Game 4: Volume Based Pricing plus Voluntary Curbside Collection. 
Private costs 
Public benefits 5 
Private benefits 
6 
6 
5 
a "Given calc" refers to games under calculative rationality. 
5 
3 
6 
3 
8 
8 
49 
o 
8 
b "db" refers to the new benefit value which when combined with the other variables as given, 
changes the groups to fully privileged. 
c "~c" refers to the new cost value which when combined with the other variables as given, 
changes the groups to fully privileged. 
d "~cnp" refers to the new cost of non-participation, i.e., fine, which when combined with the 
other variables as given, changes the groups to fully privileged. 
e "Given cons" refers to games under conservationist rationality. 
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Person2 
recycle don't recycle 
recycle * 
5,5 0, 5 
Personl 
don't recycle 5,0 -4, -4 
FIgure 17. Game 4. calculatIve ratIonalIty, costs equal benefits (publIc 
benefits=5, private costs=5, calculative costs mnp=2) *solution 
In order to shift a game structure to another, either the costs or benefits 
must change (simultaneous changes are not included in the table). The "l1c" 
shifts the costs and the benefits remain as given, "l1b" changes the benefits while 
leaving the costs as given. For any of the calculative games, if the benefits are 
greater than or equal to the costs, then the game becomes Fully Privileged. For 
example, in the volume based pricing game 4, if the cost reduction had been to 5 
(thus equally the public benefits of 5) instead of to 6 as in the game analyzed, the 
payoff would be as in Figure 17. Recycling is now the dominant strategy and 
both are in a fully privileged group. 
For the calculative voluntary policies, in order to create fully privileged 
groups either the benefits must increase dramatically, doubling for the drop-off 
center, or the costs must decrease. The only way to increase the public benefits 
is to decrease the amount of trash per person. Even in the mandatory recycling 
policy, the benefit from decreased trash was assumed to increase by one. This 
type of change would require a major shift in approach. Either the citizens 
would have to decrease the generation of unrecyclable trash, or the municipality 
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would need consider alternate disposal methods, e.g., incineration. Shifting the 
purely voluntary approaches, while not impossible, is unlikely. If the community 
cannot increase the benefits, it may attempt to cut the costs. The costs are a 
function of the time and effort for recycling and the cost of garbage collection. 
Beyond picking the recyclables up with the other unseparated garbage, there is 
not much which can be done to reduce the time and effort costs of recycling. The 
government could subsidize the cost of garbage collection if one recycles, but this 
may not be fiscally possible. 
The use of the penalty seems to be the most direct approach to changing 
the costs. Even ifpublic benefits fall to zero, the penalty still shifts the citizen 
into the fully privileged group, the benefit of cost savings being the impetus to 
recycle. However, the use of penalties is effective, if and only if, the probability 
of being caught is high. As the probability of receiving the fine decreases, then 
so does the expected value of the penalty (expected value is the probability of 
being fined times the amount of the fine). If a fine system is to work, then the 
enforcement must be strict and certain. Assuming that the mandate to recycle is 
enforced strictly, then the fine need not be as large as the fine in this study. It 
should be large enough that the total costs are less than the benefits, for 
calculative rationality this happens when the fine is 3 and for conservationist 
rationality no fine is required, as they are already in a Fully Privileged game 
under voluntary curbside collection. 
The mixed rationalities showed a Chicken structure, with conservationists 
recycling and calculative persons not. The calculative persons are free-riders, 
accepting the benefits from the conservationists without participating. Because 
the calculative persons know the conservationists will provide the public good, 
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they do not participate. Olson refers to this as the exploitation of the large by 
the small. The problem is that free-riders lead to a sub-optimal provision of the 
public good. As most communities are a mix of rationalities, it is important for 
them to address this problem, especially if their landfill situation is serious and 
complete participation is critical. 
Since the n-person and repeated games are examined under calculative 
rationality, they also require that the benefits be greater than or equal to the 
costs in order to shift the game to Fully Privileged. In the analysis the repeated 
game yielded an indeterminate solution. There was the unusual situation where 
the costs of mutual non-participation and being the only recycler were identical. 
This yielded a constant payoff for one person when the other person did not -
recycle. In a strict Prisoner's Dilemma, these would not have been equal, the 
payoff for being the only recycler would have been lower, hence, the solution of 
one recycling and one not would no longer have been Nash equilibria. The 
remaining choice, between mutual tit-for-tat or not recycling, while no less 
indeterminate in itself suggests that both would want to use the same strategy 
choice. The key for the community would be to encourage recycling so that the 
citizens would try recycling first and then do what everyone else did (which was 
to try recycling). The implication is that public awareness of recycling 
possibilities and of public participation are keys to success in repeated 
situations. 
Empirically, the effectiveness of public policy, even voluntary approaches, 
was demonstrated in the City of Waverly. If the citizens of Waverly were all 
calculative persons the voluntary drop-off center approach should not have a 
significant effect on the landfill tonnages, yet, it did. There are two 
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explanations, either some citizens have a conservation attitude and responded to 
the opportunity to recycle, or the cost-benefit differential used in the analysis 
was too large. Both of these could be explored in further research . 
. The impact of the volume based system is difficult to determine when the 
policy has been in effect for such a short period of time. The preliminary data 
suggest a significant improvement over the voluntary approach. The shift in the 
pricing system seems to have created the desired effect. The decrease in refuse 
to be landfilled could be a result of either the citizen's use of the voluntary 
curbside collection opportunity, or the citizens could be dumping their trash in 
other "free" manners. These include dumping trash in ditches or abandoned 
areas, using business dumpsters, or burning the waste illegally. These options 
bypass the system and may mask the true effect of the policy. Again, these could 
be explored in a more thorough examination of municipalities and counties and 
their refuse reduction policies. The remaining hypotheses could not be 
empirically examined with the Waverly data. The comparison of the voluntary 
approaches to each other and of the price changing approaches to each other will 
have to be explored in a comprehensive empirically based study. 
The purpose of this study was to examine the impact of incentive based 
changes in recycling policy to reduce the refuse sent to landfills. The use of 
recycling programs is one approach to shifting the waste stream away from 
landfills. Although recycling has been a popular idea since the 1970s, it is not 
until recently, with state mandated reductions in landfilled refuse, that it has 
been available to most people on such a wide scale. The decision to recycle or not 
is an individual decision based on the costs and benefits which one faces and on 
the behavior of the other people in the community. Using game theory it was 
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possible to examine these interactions and make predictions about the decisions 
the individuals will make. The exploration of rationalities proved to be a 
worthwhile undertaking. Calculative rationality, simple and unambiguous, 
provided the launch point for the analysis. The introduction of a conservation 
attitude provided a foil for strict calculative approach and the preliminary 
evidence suggests some explanatory power for a conservationist rationality in 
recycling decisions. 
The incentive based policy represents an alternate approach to local 
common resource problem study. The potential effectiveness outlined above, 
suggests that repricing may address the underlying cause of the problem, the 
mispricing of the environment. The price change forces the prices to be a "true 
reflection" of both the private and social costs oflandfill usage. Additionally, 
voluntary incentive based policies offer an alternative to mandates. Because 
participation is voluntary, the citi~ens are presented with an increased menu of 
options. These may be slanted towards certain behaviors but the ultimate 
decision remains with the citizen. The hitch to this type of analysis is in the 
measurement of costs and benefits. Loosely, these can be derived from readily 
available data. However, in order to measure the moral costs and benefits or the 
discount rate for future environmental costs, more research will be needed. 
Escaping the tragedy of the commons requires an approach to public 
policy which addresses the underlying forces at work. The causes include the 
rationalities of the participants and of the rules which structure the use of the 
commons. While not all COmnlons issues are the same (Sandler 1992a), some 
also may be amenable to this type of analysis. With local governments facing 
shrinking budgets and growing responsibilities, it is important that they enact 
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policies which are both effective and cost-effective. Incentives may be the 
answer because they address some underlying causes of the problem and the 
behavior patterns that surround the problem. The policies can be self-enforcing, 
helping to minimize government expenditure. The results of this study indicate 
that as the structure of the rules, or public policy, changes to reflect the true cost 
of the landfill usage then individual users of the landfill will change their 
behavior accordingly. 
The clarion call of thirty years ago, to get off the road of ease and 
environmental degradation and on to the road, "the one less traveled by," is still 
sounding. Today it is landfills, the filling oflandfills, and the possible 
contamination of groundwater sources which threatens the environment. The 
·solution is, as we all know intuitively, to work together, to establish an 
atmosphere encouraging such group or collective behavior. It seems as though, 
in addition to appealing to good hearts, attempting to close the gap between the 
private costs and social costs is a viable approach. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER STUDY 
The hypotheses resulting from the game analysis of the policies are the 
primary results of this study. However, these hypotheses need to be tested 
empirically as the data becomes available. Iowa requires that the cities and 
corresponding landfills present plans for how they will reach the mandated 
reductions. In 1994, these plans need to be substantiated with numerical 
support to show that the planning areas have reached their goals. At that time, 
with the data base, it will be possible to do a more rigorous examination of the 
hypotheses presented here. 
One question to be addressed builds on the Waverly example presented 
here. How do the various policies impact the waste stream? Using the analysis 
of the incentive structures presented above, it should be possible to test the 
predicted decreases in the waste stream. The municipalities would be the level 
of analysis,. Other intervening variables which could be explored are the 
population of the municipality, its location as either an urban or rural area, 
possibly its location or region (North, South, East, or West) within the state 
itself, and the activeness of the citizenry on environmental issues. Some other 
variables to be considered would be the socio-economic characteristics of the 
municipality, such as, per capita income, average educational achievement and 
average age of the citizens, in addition to the size of the municipality. 
From a random sampling of towns in Iowa certain information could be 
collected: 1) all historical and present ordinances dating to 1987, 2) municipal 
waste levels 1988-1994 (or whatever is available), 3) a basic history of the 
implementation process, including the dates of various dates in the plan, 4) type 
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of municipal government, and 5) some sense of the participation of the citizenry 
in the formulation and implementation of the programs. From the 1990 U.S. 
Census one could collect: 1) median income of citizen, 2) median age of citizenry, 
3) town population, 4)urbanlrural designation. Together, this would present a 
detailed picture of the varying impact of policies by town. At the same time, 
survey sampling could be used to measure a conservation ethic. Questions 
establishing an attitudinal scale could be used, mirroring the environmental 
ethic spectrum presented in this study. 
Additional questions for further research grow out of this work. As stated 
the price, either volume rate or fixed rate, used can alter the impact of a policy 
on any given city. It may be possible to search an optimal price for the volume 
rate or for the fine level. A price which is either too high or too low introduces 
new problems. A rate increase too low to actually alter behavior would amount 
to little more than an indirect tax increase; while, a figure too large may be 
exploitative and again represent a revenue increase for the municipality (or 
private hauler) under the guise of an effective policy. Another related issue is 
the discount rate. 
At least one publication has shown that people discount human lives at 
approximately the same rate that they discount money (Cropper and Portney 
1992,3). The question here would be at what rate do citizens discount 
environmental degradation? This is important for the repeated game and for 
determining the costs of non-participation and mutual non-participation. As the 
discount rates change, the costs and benefits required to shift the game to Fully 
Privileged will change. Understanding the relationship will enable 
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administrators and policy fonnulators to suggest changes in the price structure 
to reflect the impact of the discount rate. 
As is common, more questions seem to flow from research than it answers. 
In this case new questions address the relationships among people, between 
people and their environment, and even citizens' fundamental views on right and 
wrong. Rather than approaching the community as a cohesive whole, it is 
necessary to understand it as a dynamic entity, respecting the importance of the 
individuals of which it is composed. This line of research can help policy 
formulators to see and understand the refuse problem in a new, truer light, thus 
enabling them to respond novel and effective ways. 
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